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ABSTRACT 
Information systems offshore outsourcing is motivated by such factors as globalisation, 
technological development and the possibility to explore new markets. However, both the 
geographical and the cultural distance create more risks than in onshore outsourcing. The aim 
of this paper is to develop a typology of firms based on the specific motivations and risks 









Organisational and business models have recently undergone radical changes due to the trend 
toward globalisation and to the disintegration of enterprise value chains linked to providers 
and/or customers. The changes have been compounded by a vast number of technological 
developments (Clott, 2007). One result of these changes has been the outsourcing of 
Information Systems (IS), not only nationally (onshore outsourcing) but also internationally 
(offshore outsourcing) (Kumar, 2006). Indeed, while outsourcing information technologies 
(IT) represents a growing worldwide phenomenon in the new millennium, the growth of 
offshore outsourcing has been particularly remarkable (Koong, Liu and Wang, 2007).  For 
instance, the IT market moved over 185 billion € around the world in 2005 (IDATE 
Foundation, 2005). Forrester estimates that the world’s IT and applications outsourcing 
market is now worth around $120 billion per year (Takahashi and Sayer, 2007) and forecasts 
that European firms will increase their IT outsourcing expenditure in 2008. The Gartner 
Group expects the global IT outsourcing market to grow from$180.5 billion in revenues in 
2003 to $253.1 billion in 2008 (Forrester, 2004). Eighty-seven percent of the companies 
interviewed by KPMG plan to maintain or increase their outsourcing levels (ZDNet, 2007) 
and International Data Corporation has forecast that IT service dealers will make $29.4 billion 
USD worldwide by 2010, with few visible signs of potential decline in this market (ZDNet, 
2006). Although the numerical predictions vary from one source to another, the favourable 
prospects and expectations for growth in the coming years are undeniable. 
 
IT offshore outsourcing brings problems similar to those associated with onshore or national 
outsourcing (Harland, Knight, Lamming and Walker, 2005; Paisittan and Olson, 2006; Yang, 
Kim, Nam and Min, 2007) and is attractive for similar reasons. It also has comparable 
                                                 
1 The authors would like to thank the editor and two anonymous reviewers for all their suggestions.  
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potential risks (Lin, Pervan and McDermid, 2007; Taylor, 2006-2007; Osei-Bryson and 
Ngwenyama, 2006). IS offshore outsourcing, however, has a number of challenges which are 
specific to it and differ from those found in onshore outsourcing. Firms must contend with 
differences in languages, culture, and time zones. Offshore efforts are likely to require more 
changes within the IS organisation than domestic outsourcing. Offshoring involves such risks 
as loss of core knowledge and vendor opportunism, data security, privacy problems and 
complying with foreign laws and regulations. Problems such as possible layoffs and loss of 
human capital are more likely with offshore outsourcing than with onshore outsourcing 
(Carmel, 2006; Oshri, Kotlarsky and Willcocks, 2007; Ranganathan and Balaji, 2007; 
Rottman and Lacity, 2004).  
Studies examining the risks in offshore outsourcing are numerous (i.e. Apte et al, 1997; Khan 
et al, 2003; Kliem, 2004; Ramarapu, Parzinger and Lado, 1997). We have taken a more 
holistic perspective by looking simultaneously at the perceptions of motivation and risk, 
which is somewhat unusual2. This paper seeks to understand the motivations and risks in 
offshore outsourcing by conducting an exploratory field survey in the largest Spanish firms 
and establishing a typology of firms involved in offshore outsourcing. We first examine the 
position of Spanish firms in connection with onshore as well as offshore outsourcing. We then 
describe determining factors for offshore outsourcing with a special focus on the motivations 
and the risks linked to it. Next we present our methodology along with results and 
conclusions. 
 
2. INFORMATION SYSTEMS OFFSHORE OUTSOURCING: MOTIVATIONS AND 
RISKS 
2.1. Information Systems Offshore Outsourcing 
                                                 
2 We must mention the seminal paper by Carmel and Agarwal (2002), who researched into the offshore 
outsourcing driving factors and impediments. 
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What do we mean by IS offshore outsourcing? The term implies contracting all or part of an 
enterprise’s IT functions with a provider located abroad (Rao, 2004) that will provide tangible 
or intangible, human or non-human, resources (Kumar and Palvia, 2002). We must draw a 
clear distinction between offshore outsourcing and parallel business relationships. For 
example, offshoring is when a foreign division or subsidiary of the parent company performs 
IT functions (Pai and Basu, 2007). The expression offshore insourcers refers to multinationals 
such as GE, IBM and SAP that have the means to set up regional branch centres to lower 
costs and other resource-related advantages in different countries (Shao and David, 2007). 
Cosourcing represents an evolutionary step in offshore outsourcing that arises after the client-
vendor relationship has existed for a reasonable period of time. The outsourcer and client 
meld their human resources to complete the client’s work (Kaiser and Hawk, 2004).  
The factors underlying the emergence and growth of IS offshore outsourcing in recent years 
are varied and intertwined (Gonzalez, Gasco and Llopis, 2006). Economic and market 
globalisation is one factor since offshore outsourcing is yet another aspect of the globalisation 
and delocalisation process (Kliem, 2004). The shortage of qualified labour both in the US and 
in Europe during the late 1990s clearly encouraged offshore outsourcing (Arber and Sayed-
Ahmed, 2005; Tafti, 2005). Firms are making significant efforts to offset labour deficits in 
developing areas such as India, Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe through investments in 
science, math and engineering education, consequently graduating large numbers of 
technically skilled students to work in offshore projects (Gupta and Chaudhari, 2006). The 
need to shorten the development time cycle of IS projects is another relevant factor (Sobol 
and Apte, 1995); IT products and services have an increasingly short life cycle and this has 
increased the demand for more flexibility at IT enterprises.  
The main offshore outsourcing strengths come from the technological and economic 
dimensions, though. Developments in networking, digitalisation and storage technologies are 
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transforming IT operations, particularly routine tasks, into utility-like services that an 
organisation can provide and manage from anywhere at any time. When communication 
networks like the Internet are ubiquitous and reliable and operate at almost zero latency, it 
makes little difference if IT services originate in the same firm, in the same city, or elsewhere 
in the world (Shao and David, 2007). In economic terms, cost savings are one of the most 
important factors. For instance, a programmer who earns up to $100,000 USD in California 
earns $30,000 or less in India (Menon, 2005). 
 
2.2. Offshore Outsourcing: Motivations and Risks 
 
Several theories have been put forth in the past 15 years to explain IS outsourcing, both  
offshore and onshore, including outsourcing motivations and risks. We examine offshore 
outsourcing motivations and risks which are related with factors like costs, technology and 
infrastructure, time, quality, and also international and employment factors (see Appendix A – 
Table 1). 
 
The ‘Cost Saving’ Motivation. According to the transaction cost theory, (Williamson, 1975, 
1979), we must consider two main costs in the production of goods or services: production 
costs (work, capital and materials); and coordination costs (derived from managing and 
controlling employees). If the firm goes to the market instead of performing all activities in-
house, coordination costs turn into transaction costs, which arise from the need to negotiate, 
monitor and enforce contracts and coordinate activities beyond the borders of the organisation 
(Wang, 2002). This theory suggests that offshore outsourcing is more efficient than 
performing IS activities in-house or than onshore outsourcing when production costs are 
lower. Firms are attracted to offshore providers by economies of scale which can benefit the 
customer through lower prices (Apte et al, 1997; Grover, Cheon and Teng, 1994).  But the 
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biggest attraction of offshore outsourcing is the difference in salary between staff in the home 
country and in the provider country (Ravichandran and Ahmed, 1993). 
 
The ‘Hidden Costs’ Risk. In contrast with these savings, the hidden costs of offshore 
outsourcing may be higher than those of IS outsourcing in general (Barthélemy, 2001). These 
hidden costs can be explained by the agency theory, which sees the firm as a link in contracts 
between principals and agents. This theory assumes the existence of asymmetric information 
and different perceptions of risk between principal and agent, as well as uncertainty (Dibbern 
et al., 2004); the principal transfers decision rights to the agent and,  to make sure that the 
latter behaves in the former’s best interest, the principal sets incentives. The anticipated costs 
of controlling the agent come into play when calculating the nature of these incentives. 
Cheon, Grover and Teng (1995) maintain that agency costs depend on five factors -outcome 
uncertainty, risk aversion, programmability, outcome measurability and length of the 
relationship- two of which are related to the hidden cost risk. The ‘uncertainty’ is due to 
government policies, the economic climate, technological change, competitors’ actions and so 
on. ‘Programmability’ refers to how much one can specify appropriate behaviour of the 
outsourcing provider in advance. The hidden costs risk is linked to uncertainty and 
programmability since, when these risks appear, agency costs become higher. We should also 
consider the importance of the transaction cost theory to explain these hidden costs.  This 
theory posits that the critical dimensions of a transaction are the specificity of the asset that is 
the object of transaction; the frequency with which this transaction takes place; and the 
uncertainty associated with this transaction. From this third characteristic derives the 
uncertainty and/or lack of knowledge about the provider, another factor for hidden costs. 
Hidden costs include (Barthélemy, 2001) the coordination costs the firms must incur while 
getting to know the providers as well as their labour legislation and culture, the costs of the 
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transfer of know-how from customer to provider, the costs resulting from the adoption of 
opportunistic behaviour by the provider which can increase with distance, and even the costs 
of uncertainty about fluctuations in currency exchange rates (Kliem, 2004; Khan et al., 2003). 
 
The ‘Technical Feasibility’ Motivation. Loh and Venkatraman (1992) and Hu, Saunders and 
Gebelt (1997) characterise IS outsourcing as an administrative innovation which can apply to 
IS offshore outsourcing. This approach starts from the implicit assumption that decisions 
related to outsourcing, whether onshore or offshore, have to do with the influence that outside 
agents have on the decision-makers within the organisation. Thus, the more widespread the 
offshore outsourcing practice is and the more information about this type of strategy, the 
greater the likelihood of adopting this decision. Both the academic and the economic press 
have acted as external agents in these decisions, repeatedly highlighting the technical 
feasibility of offshore outsourcing, from which the “technical feasibility” motivation stems. 
This advantage has already appeared as a factor driving offshore outsourcing, since 
telecommunications, and above all the Internet, make possible a rapid connection with 
practically every corner of the planet (Menon, 2005; Misra, 2004). 
 
The ‘Poor Infrastructure’ Risk. Transaction cost theory shows us that transaction cost 
depends on the specificity of the assets, the frequency of the transactions and the uncertainty 
of the transaction (Williamson, 1975, 1979). The uncertainty due to the lack of knowledge 
about the infrastructure of the offshore firm makes us realize that despite the previous 
advantage, many  developing countries, which are frequently the main  outsourcing 
destinations, have inadequate telecommunications infrastructures and even lack more basic 
infrastructures such as the electricity supply (Carmel, 2003). 
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The ‘Flexibility and Speed’ Motivation. Relational exchange theory focuses on cooperation, 
interaction, and social and economic exchange as major factors in  relationships among 
organisations, and more specifically on  interactions among parties that join together to 
accomplish their objectives (Klepper, 1995). The partners assume that the benefits of the 
outcome exceed those they could achieve on their own. This theory is the basis for the 
“flexibility and speed motivation”, which arise from the joint action of client and provider in 
the offshore relationship thanks to their complementary time and resources. Quickness has 
become a priority for the IT industry. For instance, externalising part of the systems 
development process  means that  executing a project can  take place 24 hours a day because, 
at least in theory, when the working day begins in some time zones, it ends in others – this is 
the ‘managing around the clock’ effect – (Khan et al., 2003; Pfannenstein and Tsai, 2004). 
 
The ‘Different Time Zones’ Risk. (Williamson, 1975, 1979)) Transaction costs include those 
arising from coordinating activities across the borders of the organisation (Wang, 2002). The 
coordination between client and provider can become problematic due to different time zones 
which may hinder client-provider communication in real time. The motivation to offshore 
outsource might become a problem if one considers how difficult it is for the customer and 
the provider of offshoring services to coordinate their operations (Carmel, 2006). Although 
this might seem a minor drawback, it is not. Many firms look for providers in nearby time 
zones because it allows the members of a ‘distributed team’ to work in the same time zone 
(Apte et al, 1997; Rao, 2004). 
 
The ‘Improved Quality’ Motivation. Resource-based theory views a firm as a collection of 
productive resources (those inputs which enable it to perform a particular task) and capacities 
(those abilities and skills the firm needs to coordinate and exploit the resources to meet an 
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objective) (Watjatrakul, 2005). From this theoretical point of view, we can see offshore 
outsourcing as a mechanism that fills the gaps between a firm’s own resources and 
capabilities and the resources and capabilities that the firm needs. Cheon, Grover and Teng 
(1995) argue that IS outsourcing is a strategic decision that can help bridge the gaps (the 
difference between the desired resources and capabilities and the actual ones) in the IS 
resources and capabilities of firms. The authors use the example of information quality and 
staff quality to explain several of the resources or capabilities that result from outsourcing. 
The same holds true for offshore outsourcing because it covers shortages of internal resources 
and capabilities and/or onshore resources and capabilities. In conclusion, this theory allows us 
to identify the “improved quality” motivation, where the customer’s outcome goals for 
outsourcing evolve. Initially, cost reduction was the prime goal, but buyers’ expectations are 
moving beyond low-cost solutions (Chitale, 2006). Firms currently adopt offshore 
outsourcing in the hope that it will improve their business results. This means that outsourcing 
no longer constitutes a tactical solution of a technical nature but a strategic solution that 
creates and defends the firm’s competitive advantage (Erber and Sayed-Ahmed, 2005; Pai and 
Basu, 2007). We should take into account access to high levels of expertise (Mahnke, 
Wareham and Bjorn-Andersen, 2008) and the positive impact on IS service quality. 
 
The ‘Deficient Quality’ Risk. One of the biggest risks in offshore outsourcing is when the 
services delivered do not reach the quality level required. This happens if the provider’s staff 
has not received enough training and does not know the customer’s language well enough, 
which may hinder customer-provider communication.  Problems may also arise from lack of 
knowledge about managerial tasks as well as project management and implementation skills, 
which has occurred with some offshore providers (Zatolyuk and Allgood, 2004). Transaction 
cost theory can explain these risks, as the uncertainty related to transaction costs can imply a 
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lack of knowledge about the quality of the provider’s services. Agency theory also explains 
these risks. Cheon, Grover and Teng (1995) argue that agency costs relate to five factors, two 
of which are uncertainty and programmability. In conditions of high uncertainty and low 
programmability (typical in many offshore contracts) the “deficient quality” risk may arise. 
 
The ‘Access to International Markets’ Motivation. Strategic management theories, including 
the competitive strategy theory and the competitive advantage theory, have been often used to 
explain how IT can contribute to competitive advantage (Porter and Millar, 1985). These 
theories state that firms have long-term goals and thus plan and allocate resources to achieve 
these goals. Porter and Millar (1985) explain that we must observe the added value chain and 
ask how IT can change the scope of competence. One of the questions they address 
specifically is whether these technologies allow expanding the business internationally. A 
similar discussion has emerged in the offshore outsourcing area, as some firms adopt offshore 
outsourcing because of access to international markets”. For many companies, offshore 
outsourcing represents a way not only to find providers, but also to acquire a better 
knowledge of other countries and explore their potential as future markets (Ravichandran and 
Ahmed, 1993; Sobol and Apte, 1995). This is relevant considering that many countries 
providing offshore IT services, such as China or Russia, have an enormous potential due to 
their large populations and their economic growth expectations (Rottman and Lacity, 2006). 
 
Risks related to Language, Cultural, Political and Legal Problems. Offshore outsourcing 
faces many difficulties linked to culture, language, politics and law. Hofstede’s study on 
National Cultures (1991, 2001), now a key part of research on global work and international 
business relationships (David et al.; 2008), says there is no universal management method 
equally applicable to all countries. It is impossible to separate management from other 
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processes that exist in each society. Managers in charge of offshore projects must be able to 
incorporate cultural variations from different nations. The concept of national cultures and 
their implications for management helps to explain the “cultural problems” risk, as the lack of 
cultural congruence between customer and provider may generate communication problems, 
especially when a language barrier exists (Kim, Meso and Kim, 2005). Culture has effects  on 
the way managers interact with their employees, how they perceive the importance of 
authority or teamwork, and how they respond to gender issues or quality of life issues 
(Krishna, Sashay and Walsham, 2004; Mahnke, Wareham and Bjorn-Andersen, 2008; Rao, 
2004). Risk occurs also when political instability or poor relations exist between the 
customer’s country and the provider’s (Hemphill, 2004). Legal factors can also influence the 
outsourcing relationship, including (Pai and Basu, 2007) the legislation that will govern the 
outsourcing contract; solving problems related to software use licenses and permits; analysing 
legislation on data protection; adhering to laws on intellectual property; and understanding the 
negative effects that local laws can have on the outsourcing relationship. Some countries 
competing for leadership in offshore outsourcing, for example, have no guarantees for 
intellectual property and other basic protections (Menon, 2005; Oshri, Kotlarsky and 
Willcocks, 2007; Ranganathan and Balaji, 2007; Rottman and Lacity, 2006). Political and 
legal problems in foreign countries are connected to uncertainty about transaction costs and 
agency costs, so transaction cost theory and agency theory may also help to explain these 
risks. 
 
The ‘Improved Cost/Benefit Ratio’ Motivation. The resource-based theory sees offshore 
outsourcing as a way to fill the gaps between the firm’s resources and capabilities and the 
resources and capabilities it needs. Cheon, Grover and Teng (1995) said that cost 
effectiveness could be one of the targets of IS outsourcing. The potential cost effectiveness 
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implies an increased level of efficiency by the offshore outsourcing customer firm and, 
consequently, an improved cost/benefit ratio. This advantage not only affects offshore 
outsourcing customers directly but also has broader consequences because, in theory, 
customers outsource to the most efficient provider, which makes the IT service more efficient 
at the same time (Misra, 2004). 
 
The ‘Increased Unemployment Rate’ Risk. In a media-driven society like ours, concern about 
the reputation effects of firms’ behaviours and corporate social responsibility become more 
important in all the organisation’ actions (Midttun et al, 2007). Corporate social responsibility 
refers to activities aimed at providing social contributions that ultimately yield economic 
returns to investors (Doh; 2005). This view of corporate social responsibility reveals a new 
problem in offshore outsourcing: the “increased unemployment rate” risk. Bruce and Martz 
(2007) noted that IT employees are potentially affected by offshore outsourcing, and event 
students (future employees) could be affected also, as their job opportunities could be 
impacted by offshoring. This could have serious consequences, but the main focus of this 
paper is the effect of this risk on the morale, productivity and behaviour of the offshore 
client’s staff. Offshore outsourcing implies greater risks for the IT workers of developed 
countries (the customers) than onshore outsourcing. National (onshore) outsourcing often 
involves the transfer of workers from the customer firm to the service provider, and as a result 
the staff may benefit from improved career opportunities. Nevertheless, offshore outsourcing 
may cause problems ranging from occupational stress (Brooks, 2006) to labour hazards and 
possible salary reductions (Shao and David, 2007). Hence the great concern among 
associations of IT professionals about the negative effects of offshore outsourcing (Brigham, 
2005; Hirscheeim, 2006; IEEE, 2004; Pfannenstein and Tsai, 2004) justifies why both 
governments and firms, and even workers, have to take measures to minimise those harmful 
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impacts (Gupta and Chaudhari, 2006). Despite the frequent mention of this risk in papers, 
there are no conclusive data supporting it (Rottman and Lacity, 2004) and, according to the 
ILO (OIT, 2005), the proportion of the unemployment figures that one can directly attribute to 
offshore outsourcing is not especially high3.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
Based on the assumption that larger-sized firms are the most likely to outsource (Lee, 
Miranda and Kim, 2004), we distributed a questionnaire to the largest Spanish enterprises. 
The ‘5,000 Largest Firms’ Directory of the Actualidad Económica magazine—later collated 
with other databases such as Duns and Bradstreet’s ‘The 50,000 Most Important Spanish 
Firms’— established the target population for the study. We removed 893 of the 5,000 firms 
with higher turnovers included in the first database because their address and telephone 
coincided with those of others, which suggested that they were subsidiary or affiliate 
companies.  
The remaining 4,107 firms received questionnaires along with a stamped self-addressed 
envelope. The questionnaire derives from a previous one prepared by the same authors and 
constructed, like this one, from the literature on the topic as a reference. Additionally, some 
experts in IS management analysed the questionnaire4. We included only eight of the 26 
questions in the final questionnaire in the present paper, as this is part of a larger study which 
deals with a wide range of issues related to IS outsourcing (see appendix B). Of those eight 
questions, one pertains to the extent of outsourcing, both nationally or globally; five pertain to 
the general profile of the firms in the study as well as their IS departments and managers; and 
                                                 
3Although some of the motivations and risks mentioned could have consequences at a macroeconomic or general 
level, our interest in them lies at an organisational level (i.e., the poor infrastructures of a country could prevent a 
potential client from offshoring to specific providers in that country; the growth of the unemployment rate in a 
“client” country could affect the morale and motivation of the IT staff of a client organisation operating in that 
country). 
4 The collaboration provided by Mr. Juan Manuel Aparicio and Mr. Ramón Andarias deserves a special mention at this stage. 
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two questions deal with offshore outsourcing motivations and risks. Table 2 shows the 
measurements for the main variables analysed in the study.  
INSERT TABLE 2 
The questionnaire addressee was the IS manager of the selected firms. Unfortunately, no lists 
of these managers are available in Spain, leaving the identity of the questionnaire addressee 
unknown. We later elaborated upon the questionnaire using the statistical program SPSS for 
Windows, and treated it with univariant and multivariant methods. Table 3 shows the 
technical specifications of the empirical work. 
INSERT TABLE 3 
329 valid questionnaires were received, which represents an eight percent response rate. This 
ratio may seem low, but it is actually similar or even superior to others in comparable studies 
of IT outsourcing (Bahli and Rivard, 2005; Ma, Pearson and Tadisina, 2005; Shi, Kunnathur 
and Ragu-Nathan, 2005). It is also difficult to obtain responses to surveys carried out among 
executives, especially IS executives, because rapid technological change, considerable IT-
related investments by firms and the great interest in outsourcing have made these executives 
the target of many surveys (Poppo and Zenger, 1998). The firms that answered the 
questionnaire reflect the total population in terms of size (sales and number of employees) and 
sector. A T-test verified the possible differences in the number-of-employees mean both for 
firms which answered the survey and for those which did not, with T having a value of -1.080 
with a 0.280 significance level. In the case of sales, we used a non-parametric test ―Mann-
Whitney’s U-test― with a value of 444732.5 and a 0.338 significance level. A Chi-square test 
helped to check the possible connection between the industrial sector and the response or lack 
of response by firms. The Chi value was 2.802 and the significance level 0.246. These results 
imply the existence of a non-response bias in relation to these three variables5. 
                                                 
5 Test to show independence: firms which answered the survey and firms which did not 
 Levene Statistic 
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Because —as discussed in the next section— most of the interviewed firms did not use 
offshore outsourcing, the number of answers about offshore outsourcing motivations and risks 
was low. A total of 177 firms answered these questions, of which only 54 (30.5%) also use 
offshore outsourcing while the remaining 123 (69.5%) do not. Even so, their opinions about 
the motivations and risks perceived by firms are relevant for the present study.  
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1. General characteristics of firms and offshore outsourcing 
INSERT TABLE 4 
Table 4 shows the general features of the interviewed firms and of their IS departments and 
managers. We identified possible differences between firms which practice offshore 
outsourcing and those that do not. The study confirms that IT outsourcing has become a 
widespread phenomenon on a national scale, as 83.6% of the interviewed firms outsource 
some of their IS activities to a national provider, and only 54 firms (16.4%) do not. Global 
outsourcing continues to be an isolated phenomenon in Spain, though, since only 54 of the 
firms analysed (16.4%) look for IS providers abroad. A significant dependence relationship 
exists with respect to whether firms outsource inside or outside their country (the chi-square 
statistic detects dependence between both variables with a 0.000 significance level). Only one 
firm uses international outsourcing without national outsourcing. The rest of the firms that use 
offshore outsourcing have national providers too. 
Going back to Table 4 on the general characteristics of the firm and its activity sector, the 
firms analysed have considerable size. Only 8.7% of the firms have fewer than 50 workers 
and only 9.6% have an annual turnover below 30 million euros, most of the firms being at 
                                                                                                                                                        
No. of Employees F= 1.737 Sig.= 0.188 T= -1.080 Sig.= 0.280 
Sales F= 66.824 Sig.= 0.000 U= 444732.5 Sig.= 0.338 
Sector N.A. N.A. Chi-square= 2.802 Sig.= 0.246 
N.A. = Not applicable 
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higher levels in terms of both employee numbers and sales. Just over half of the firms belong 
to the industrial sector (57.4%), while the rest are either in the general service sector service  
(31%) or in ICT-intensive service sectors (e.g. financial and insurance institutions, along with 
enterprises  in the tourist, legal and publishing sectors, for example). The latter group (11.6% 
of the sample) includes firms that depend more than the rest on their ICT, due to the type of 
products/goods/services they offer and its elaboration process. The only dependence 
relationship between the general features of the firm and its adoption or non-adoption of 
offshore outsourcing appears in the case of sales. Indeed, firms with higher sales show a 
greater tendency to offshore outsourcing. 
Despite the size of these firms, their IS departments are small: the majority of firms (77.6%) 
have 10 or fewer employees in this department. Neither do they allocate a large proportion of 
the budget to it, as many organisations (66.7%) dedicate only 4% of their overall budget, or 
even less, to IS. Although these firms are relatively large, they allocate few financial and 
human resources to their IS departments. No dependence relationship between the 
characteristics of the IS department and the adoption or non-adoption of offshore outsourcing 
by the firm is apparent either. 
The IS manager is almost always male (91.6% of the cases). Most of the interviewees report 
directly to general management (62.6%), while reporting to finance/administration is less 
common (26.5%). Interestingly, when a woman heads the IS department (as measured with 
the chi-square statistic), the firm is more likely to use offshore outsourcing.  
 
4.2. Offshore outsourcing motivations and risks 
INSERT TABLE 5  
Table 5 shows the motivations to adopt offshore outsourcing by decreasing order of 
importance. It is evident that technical feasibility heads the list of reasons to outsource 
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offshore, i.e. the fact that the technology is available to establish international connections and 
achieve fluent communications between provider and customer has encouraged the latter to 
look for foreign providers. Firms equally seek efficiency through improving the cost/benefit 
ratio in these offshore outsourcing contracts, and the fact that flexibility and speed in IT 
projects can improve is another important factor. However, firms are not convinced that 
international services will mean more quality, and they assign little importance to whether 
outsourcing may become a way to access foreign markets. Neither are reduced costs the main 
reason for offshore outsourcing.  
INSERT TABLE 6  
Table 6 shows the risks of offshore outsourcing by decreasing order of importance, according 
to the interviewees’ perceptions. Language, cultural, political and legal problems head the list, 
the rest of the risks lagging far behind. The different time zones associated with physical 
distance are a serious problem in the interviewees’ opinion, despite asynchronous means of 
communication that could solve these difficulties. The fear of incurring greater costs than in 
onshore outsourcing is also a relevant factor. This physical and cultural distance reflects a 
certain degree of opportunism on the part of the service provider. Other problems, such as the 
quality of the provider or poor infrastructures are considered less important. In fact, technical 
feasibility is among the most significant motivations, and problems related to infrastructures 
or technology do not represent insurmountable barriers for offshore outsourcing. Finally, the 
macroeconomic consequences of offshore outsourcing, e.g. the possible increase in 
unemployment among IT professionals, does not concern the interviewees. 
 
4.3. The typology of firms 
The objective is to identify a typology of enterprises according to what they think the main 
motivations and risks associated with offshore outsourcing are. With this aim, we initially 
 18 
carried out a principal components factor analysis to summarise the information about 
outsourcing motivations. First we verified the appropriateness of the analysis, as indicated in 
Table 7, where the Correlation Matrix Determinant is close to zero, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
approaches one —although it is not one— and Bartlett’s test of sphericity is significant. 
INSERT TABLE 7 
Determining the number of factors to extract is probably rather subjective in factor analysis 
(Hu, 2006). The Kaiser’s criterion, the percentage of variance explained and the scree plot test 
are all useful criteria to help determine the number of factors to extract. Kaiser’s criterion 
suggested the need to extract a single factor (as there was only one eigenvalue above 1 —see 
Table 8). However, the eigenvalue for the second factor is 0.927, very close to 1. So we could 
also choose to extract two factors. What is more, the extraction of one factor only explains 
49.068% of the variance of the original variables, and the scree plot test indicates that the 
extraction of two factors is suitable also (see Figure 1 in the appendix C). We consequently 
decided to extract two factors that account for 64.525% of the information about the original 
variables related to offshore outsourcing motivations (which is satisfactory, as it exceeds 
50%). A Varimax rotation helped to improve the interpretation of the results, and Table 8 
shows both factors and the initial items that form them (the information concerning the higher 
values is in bold for clarity). One item (more quality than in onshore outsourcing) makes a 
nearly identical contribution to both factors, so we excluded it in the interpretation of factors. 
INSERT TABLE 8 
We can call Factor 1 Improvement Motivations. It groups together the factors that, as the 
unidimensional analysis above showed, are more relevant to offshore outsourcing (technical 
feasibility, improved cost/benefit ratio and greater flexibility as well as speed in projects). The 
motivations underlying this factor contribute more directly to the improvement of the IS 
services. This first factor is the most important, since it explains 37.161% of the variance. The 
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second factor explains the remaining 27.363% and has less relevance, in keeping with the 
opinions of the interviewees (who assigned less importance to lower offshore outsourcing 
costs compared to onshore outsourcing and to access to international markets). We call this 
second factor Cost and Expansion motivations. 
We next conducted a new principal components factor analysis of offshore outsourcing risks 
Table 9 reveals that this analysis was pertinent, too, as it examined the values of the 
Correlation Matrix Determinant near zero, the KMO index close to one, and a significant 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity.   
INSERT TABLE 9 AND 10 
We followed Kaiser’s method in extracting as many factors as eigenvalues above 1 exist, 
since there were precisely two eigenvalues above one which accounted for 69.892% of the 
information concerning the initial items (see also Figure 2 in relation to the scree plot – 
appendix C). After extracting these two factors, we catalogued the first as cost-related and 
secondary problems because, as shown in the univariant analysis, these problems (e.g. hidden 
costs, difficulties with infrastructures or an increased national unemployment rate) seemed 
less important to the interviewees. Instead, the second factor summarises the information 
referring to the problems identified as the most relevant (those related to language, cultural, 
political and legal issues, different time zones, and lower quality than in onshore outsourcing). 
We term these cultural and quality problems.  
The four factors obtained for global outsourcing motivations and risks served as the basis for 
a cluster analysis to classify enterprises according to their views about those motivations and 
risks. We used two steps in the cluster analysis, following previous studies of cluster 
formulation in the IS area (Malhotra el at., 2005). First, a hierarchical cluster technique 
decided the number of clusters to find, and, second, a non- hierarchical cluster method helped 
us define those clusters. 
 20 
During the first stage, we standardised the aggregate scores for each of the constructs, squared 
Euclidean distances acted as a similarity measure, and Ward’s minimum variance method was 
useful at cluster formation. We studied the dendogram6 produced by the Ward method and the 
agglomeration coefficient and we saw the biggest percentage coefficient change with two 
clusters, concluding that the use of two clusters was pertinent (Table 11). 
INSERT TABLE 11 
Afterwards, we carried out a non-hierarchical conglomerate analysis with the K-means 
method to generate two clusters, with the four factors mentioned above (motivations and 
risks), validating the result with the ANOVA analysis. We confirmed that the analysis was 
pertinent because all the variables were significant (see Table 12).  
INSERT TABLE 12 
The two resulting clusters had 85 and 83 cases respectively. We interpreted each one of them 
next, determining how they differ. Table 13 offers the equality of means test of the groups. 
INSERT TABLE 13 
The first cluster includes enterprises that can be described as realistic about offshore 
outsourcing, which includes firms that assign more importance to the motivations that 
contribute most to the improved IS services, namely technical feasibility; flexibility and 
speed; and an improved cost/benefit ratio. This cluster does not assign the same importance to 
cost and expansion motivations. Firms in this cluster consider all risk factors in general very 
relevant and are more aware of them than those firms in Cluster 2. 
Enterprises in the second cluster do not attach so much significance to outsourcing risks and, 
instead, pay more attention to cost and expansion motivations. We call these firms ‘optimistic 
though disinformed’ because they cannot see the risks but value the motivations which, as the 
univariant study demonstrates, are not the most important element. 
                                                 
6 Readers could apply for the dendogram graphic to the corresponding author. 
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The first cluster is the most populous, though only slightly more than the second. We can thus 
state that the interviewed firms have a realistic attitude toward international outsourcing, are 
aware of its risks, and understand its main advantages. The number of firms in the second 
cluster suggests that many of the largest Spanish firms are still unaware of the risks associated 
with offshore outsourcing, perhaps because they do not practise it. Their only concern is the 
secondary or less important advantages of lower cost and access to international markets. 
The next step was to verify the potential identification of the clusters obtained with certain 
characteristics of the enterprises that could act as control variables; i.e. size (by sales volume 
and number of workers), sector, and IS department size (in terms of staff and budget 
percentage allocated). Unfortunately, we could not find any statistically significant 
relationship between the clusters and these variables, but we did find a very interesting link 
between the clusters and the adoption (or non-adoption) of offshore outsourcing (Table 
14).The firms that engage in more offshore outsourcing are predominantly in cluster one 
(realistic about offshore outsourcing), while firms doing less offshore outsourcing more often 
belong to the second cluster (optimistic though disinformed).  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Despite the rise of offshore outsourcing, Spanish enterprises show some delay in adopting this 
practice, not a surprising result since it confirms conclusions drawn from previous studies 
(Doldan, Luna, Martínez and Piñeiro, 2006). Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2002) showed that 
IS outsourcing is more mature in the United States than in Europe. Waarts and Van Everdinge 
(2005) confirm that, within Europe, the Nordic countries are more responsive to innovation 
than the Mediterranean ones (including Spain), which are more likely to avoid uncertainty. 
Since outsourcing can be considered an innovation (Hoecht and Trott, 2006), Spain’s low 
offshore outsourcing level is consistent.  
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This paper has explored the validity of both the risks and the motivations of offshore 
outsourcing through the interviewed firms.  All the interviewees supported the motivations, 
except for the ‘higher quality of international outsourcing’ reason. The questions on risk have 
mostly ranked as very or relatively important with the exception of the ‘increased national 
unemployment rate’ risk.  Therefore, both managers and researchers should consider the 
motivations and risks discussed in later studies about offshore outsourcing theories and 
practice. 
The most significant motivations to use offshore outsourcing include its technical feasibility, 
improved efficiency or cost/benefit ratio, and the greater flexibility and speed that this type of 
outsourcing affords. Supply clearly drives demand in this case and not the other way round, 
i.e. the existence of rapid, remote connections between customers and providers, even if 
distances are considerable, encourages offshore outsourcing. The advantages of lower costs 
are important, but not the prime factor behind the practice. This conclusion seems relevant 
since the advantage derived from lower salaries in countries such as India cannot be a 
sustainable long-term competitive advantage and, in fact, these offshore providers are looking 
for alternative strategies that can allow them to deliver services with higher quality levels 
and/or more added-value (King, 2005). Some data exist to confirm that, although the cost 
advantages of offshore outsourcing will continue to be important for quite a few years, their 
relevance is gradually starting to decline (Perelman, 2007).  
Among the most significant risks are language, cultural, political and legal problems, along 
with the different time zones and the potential hidden costs of offshore outsourcing. In short, 
the most relevant risks or problems linked to offshore outsourcing have to do with the human 
factor rather than with technology. This supports the results obtained in other studies (KPMG, 
2007) which conclude that only 12% of customers believe that offshore outsourcing problems 
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only have to do with technology, while 60% of customers think that the problems stem from 
the ‘human factor’. 
This research has identified two typologies of firms:  realistic about offshore outsourcing or 
optimistic though disinformed. The former are good at identifying the main motivations to 
outsource, such as the improvement in IS services, and are equally aware of the risks. These 
firms engage in substantial offshore outsourcing and guide themselves by motivations which 
initially do not appear as priorities in practice, such as ‘access to international markets’ and 
‘lower costs of offshore outsourcing’.  Firms with low levels of offshore outsourcing do not 
pay much attention to offshore outsourcing risks in general. The first cluster is more 
numerous, which suggests that most of the interviewed firms are aware of both the main 
motivations and the main risks associated with offshore outsourcing. 
We can establish some connections between the clusters obtained in this study and those 
identified by Carmel and Agarwal (2002).  Optimistic though disinformed firms do not 
practice offshore outsourcing to a large extent and are similar to the firms Carmel and 
Agarwal call offshore bystanders in their paper.  There are some differences, though. In our 
group, although many of the firms do not offshore and are unaware of the risks entailed, they 
still value the advantages of this strategy.  Among our cluster managers, even those who do 
not practise offshore outsourcing see these options. 
Similarly, even they are not exactly the same, we find resemblances between the cluster 
‘realistic about offshore outsourcing’ and the group Carmel and Agarwal call proactive 
strategy focus. Our cluster includes the firms which practise offshore more often and value the 
most important motivations, those with a strategic rather than a cost focus. The cluster also 
includes those firms showing a greater level of awareness about offshore outsourcing risks. 
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Consequently, after analysing the typology presented in our paper, we can say that managers 
in the largest Spanish firms tend to recognise the importance of offshore outsourcing even 
when their organisations do not practise it and though this strategy is not common in Spain. 
The bandwagon effect (Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993) is reaching offshore outsourcing 
practices, although the effect is slower in Spanish firms that in the rest of Europe and the US. 
Offshore outsourcing seems to be an unstoppable global phenomenon with an array of 
challenges to top executives and IS managers. The feasibility of IS offshore services give 
managers an opportunity to improve the IS services in their firms. So although economic 
motivations are relevant, managers should also take into account that they are not the first 
movers nor the unique in their decision to offshore outsource. On the other side cultural 
problems, those related with behaviours, are restringing the generalization of offshore 
practice, especially in the Spanish firms. We think that it is necessary to invest in staff 
training and education (both on the client and on the supplier side) to overcome cultural 
barriers and other obstacles   
The present study is not without limitations, including a low response rate. However, we 
should recall that this ratio is similar to those obtained in others studies about IS outsourcing. 
Due to this response rate, it has been statistically impossible to analyse separately the answers 
of “domestic cases” (firms doing outsourcing only in their country) and “offshore cases” 
(firms doing offshore). Anyway, as we have stated before, the paper is focused on studying 
“perceptions” of motivations and risks, we are analysing “opinions”. So it’s also interesting to 
know the opinions of firms not doing offshoring, and to verify that they are more identified 
with one of the clusters. The survey focuses on Spain, and results may not apply to other 
countries, but we think the study adds value because, to the best of our knowledge, there are 
few studies on the topic in Spain. The present study could represent an innovative 
contribution. Other limitations derive from the fact that the study addresses offshore 
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outsourcing in the largest firms. We think that it is not difficult to suppose that if largest firms 
have modest positions in offshore outsourcing, small and medium  sized firms  have an even 
smaller commitment, although  future studies should verify this. Other methodologies should 
be used to triangulate results; case studies could complement data from questionnaires in 
order to gain a richer perspective on offshore outsourcing practices and their underlying 
motivations and risks. Today globalization is a fact and IS offshore outsourcing is one of its 
facets. Academics and practitioners have a wide area to continue exploring. 
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APPENDIX A: TABLE 1 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
APPENDIX B: Questionnary 
 
1. What proportion (%) of the following activities is carried out through outsourcing? (onshore and offshore) 
 
Onshore Offshore  Onshore Offshore  
% % Applications Analysis % % Systems Operations 
% % Support to end users % % Systems Processing 
% % Data Entry % % Programming 
% % Staff and/or user training % % Security 
% % Systems Implementation % % Network Service 
% % Hardware Maintenance % % Customer Support by Telephone 
% % Software Maintenance % % E-business Solutions 
   % % Others (specify) 
 
2. Give a value to the specific motivations for offshore outsourcing. 
 
Not important at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very Important 
 
Technical Feasibility (Global Internet connections) 1  2   3  4  5  6  7 Access to international markets 1  2   3  4  5  6  7 
More flexibility and speed in IT projects 1  2   3  4  5  6  7 Lower costs than onshore 1  2   3  4  5  6  7 
Improved cost/benefit ratio in outsourcing 1  2   3  4  5  6  7 More quality than onshore 1  2   3  4  5  6  7 
 
 Others (specify) 1  2   3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
3. Give a value to the specific risks for offshore outsourcing. 
  
Not important at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very Important 
 
Less quality than onshore outsourcing 1  2   3  4  5  6  7 Scarce infrastructures in the provider's country 1  2   3  4  5  6  7 
Different time-zones between client and provider 1  2   3  4  5  6  7 Bigger Hidden Costs than onshore 1  2   3  4  5  6  7 
Problems related to language, culture, different laws   Increased Unemployment Rate onshore 1  2   3  4  5  6  7 
and/or uncertainty in the provider’s country 1  2   3  4  5  6  7 Others (specify) 1  2   3  4  5  6  7 
 
The organisation’s profile and the Information Systems Department’s profile 
4. The organisation size and its age (year 2005). 
Staff Sales (millions of  €) Date of Creation 
 0-50  Up to 30  
 51-100  More than 30 and up to 60  
 101-500  More than 60 and up to 90  
 501-1,000  More than 90 and up to 150  
 1,001-25,000  More than 150 and up to 300  
 More than 25,000  More than 300 and up to 600  
   More than 600  
 
5. Sector  
 
 
6. Profile of the Information Systems Department/Service (year 2005) 
 
IS department’s staff number:  Date of Creation:  








APPENDIX C: FIGURES 1 AND 2 




Table 1: Theories to explain Offshore Outsourcing Motivations and Risks 
Theory Motivations Risks 
Transaction Cost Theory Cost Saving 





Language, Cultural, Political and 
Legal Problems 
Innovation Theories Technical Feasibility   
Relational Exchange Theory Flexibility and Speed  
Resource-Based Theory Improved Quality 
Improved Cost/Benefit Ratio 
 
Agency Theory  Hidden Costs 
Deficient Quality 
Language, Cultural, Political and 
Legal Problems 
Strategic Management Theories Access to International Markets  
Hofstede’s Study (National Cultures)  Cultural Problems 
Corporate Social Responsibility  Increased Unemployment Rate 
 
Table 2: Variable and reliability measurements 





Gonzalez, Gasco and Llopis 
(2006) and own materials 





Idem Idem 0.808 
 
Table 3: Study Technical Specifications 
Scope Spain 
Population 4,107 of the largest Spanish firms 
Sample size 329 valid answers (8.02%) 
Sampling error 5% 
Survey date September-December, 2006 
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Table 4: Profile of firms according to whether or not they apply Offshore Outsourcing 
Offshore Outsourcing   
 Yes 
N.  (%) 
No 
N.  (%) 
Total 




Yes 53 (98.2) 222 (80.7) 275 (83.6) National 
(Onshore) 
Outsourcing 
No 1   (1.8) 53 (19.3) 54 (16.4) 9.985 0.000 
0-50 6 (11.5) 22 (8.1) 28 (8.7) 
51-500 33 (63.4) 185 (68.5) 218 (67.7) No. of workers 
More than 500 13 (25.0) 63 (23.3) 76 (23.6) 
0.792 0.673 
Up to 30 8 (15.4) 23 (8.5) 31 (9.6) 
Between 31 and 60 14 (26.9) 132 (48.9) 146 (45.3) 
Between 61 and 300 24 (46.1) 91 (33.7) 115 (35.7) 
Sales 
(millions of €) 
More than 300 6 (11.5) 24 (8.8) 30 (9.3) 
8.916 0.029 
Industry 33 (61.1) 156 (56.7) 189 (57.4) 
Services 17 (31.5) 85 (30.9) 102 (31.0) Sector 
ICT-intensive services 4 (7.4) 34 (12.4) 38 (11.6) 
1.116 0.572 
1-10 employees 36 (70.6) 214 (79.0) 250 (77.6) 
11-100 employees 13 (25.5) 53 (19.6) 66 (20.5) IS staff 
101-250 employees 2 (3.9) 4 (1.5) 6 (1.9) 
2.503 0.286 
0-4 22 (62.9 116 (67.4) 138 (66.7) 
5-10 11 (31.4) 45 (26.2) 56 (27.1) 
Budget 
percentage 
allocated to IS 11-56 2 (5.7) 11 (6.4) 13 (6.3) 
0.411 0.814 
Female 8 (15.7) 19 (7.0) 27 (8.4) 
 IS manager 
Male 43 (84.3) 250 (93.0) 293 (91.6) 
5.960 0.051 
General Management 26 (53.1) 168 (64.4) 194 (62.6) 
Finance/Administration 15 (30.6) 67 (25.7) 82 (26.5) 
IS Corporate Director 8 (16.3) 22 (8.4) 30 (9.7) 
IS manager’s 
superior’s 
working post Organisation/Planning/ 
Engineering 
0 (0.0) 4 (100. 0) 4 (1.3) 
4.633 0.201 
 
Table 5: Offshore Outsourcing Motivations 
 
Not important at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very important 
 
 Mean Median Mode 
Technical feasibility 
Improved cost/benefit ratio 
More flexibility and speed 
Lower costs than Onshore 
Access to international markets 




















Table 6: Offshore Outsourcing Risks 
 
Not important at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very important 
 
 Mean Median Mode 
Cultural, language, political and legal problems 
Different time-zones 
Higher hidden costs 
Lower quality 
Poor infrastructures at the provider’s country 






















Table 7: Offshore Outsourcing Motivations: Factor Analysis Pertinence 
 
Correlation Matrix Determinant 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Index 







Table 8: Offshore Outsourcing Motivations: Total Variance Explained and Rotated Factor Matrix 
Total variance explained  Rotated Factor Matrix 
 Initial Eigenvalues Rotation Sum of Squared Loadings Variable Factor 
Factor Total 





% of the 
variance 
































Improved cost/benefit ratio 
More flexibility and speed 
Lower costs than Onshore 
Access to international markets  














Table 9: Offshore Outsourcing risks: Factor Analysis Pertinence 
 
Correlation Matrix Determinant 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Index 







Table 10: Offshore Outsourcing Risks:Total Variance Explained and Rotated Factor Matrix  
Total variance explained Rotated Factor Matrix 
 Initial Eigenvalues 












































Lang., cult., pol. and legal problems 
Different time-zones 
Lower quality 
Higher hidden costs 
Poor infrastr. at the provider’s 
country 














Table 11: The Agglomeration Coefficient 





10 199.616 8.43 
9 216.453 8.26 
8 234.342 13.15 
7 265.167 15.42 
6 306.068 14.12 
5 349.288 15.21 
4 402.421 17.08 
3 471.171 15.83 
2 545.776 22.69 
1 669.661 - 
 
Table 12: Offshore Outsourcing Motivations and Risks Analysis Validation 
 
 
Variable (Factor) F Sign. 
‘Offshore outsourcing main motivations’ 
‘Offshore outsourcing secondary motivations’ 
‘Offshore outsourcing cost-related and secondary problems’ 











Table 13: Equality of Means Test for Offshore Outsourcing Motivations and Risks according to the Affiliation 
Cluster 
   Levene  
  Means F Sign. Statistic Sign. 
‘Main motivations’ factor 
 
Group 1 (n=85) 
Group 2 (n=83) 
0.535 
-0.593 
6.969 0.009 1156.0(1) 0.000 
‘Secondary motivations’ factor 
 
Group 1 (n=85) 
Group 2 (n=83) 
-0.389 
0.382 
1.468 0.227 -5.449(2) 0.000 
‘Cost-related and secondary problems’ 
factor 
Group 1 (n=85) 
Group 2 (n=83) 
0.400 
-0.421 0.041 0.840 5.765(2) 0.000 
‘Cultural and quality problems’ factor Group 1 (n=85) 
Group 2 (n=83) 
0.274 
-0.251 
10.373 0.001 2475.0(1) 0.001 
(1) Non-parametric Mann-Whitney’s U-Test 
(2) Student’s T-statistic 
 
Table 14: Chi-square to test independence  
 
 Clusters 
 Cluster 1: 
Realistic before Offshore Out. 
Cluster 2: 




No 53 (46.5%) 61 (53.5%) Offshore 
Outsourcing Yes 32 (59.3%) 22 (40.7%) 
2.390 0.084 







































Figure 2: Scree Plot for Offshore Outsourcing Risks Factor Analysis  
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